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We study the effect of minimum wage increases on employment in automatable jobs – jobs in 
which employers may find it easier to substitute machines for people – focusing on low-skilled 
workers from whom such substitution may be spurred by minimum wage increases. Based on 
CPS data from 1980-2015, we find that increasing the minimum wage decreases significantly the 
share of automatable employment held by low-skilled workers, and increases the likelihood that 
low-skilled workers in automatable jobs become unemployed. The average effects mask 
significant heterogeneity by industry and demographic group, including substantive adverse 
effects for older, low-skilled workers in manufacturing. The findings imply that groups often 
ignored in the minimum wage literature are in fact quite vulnerable to employment changes and 
job loss because of automation following a minimum wage increase.
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Introduction  
For decades, economists have studied the effects of the minimum wage on employees 
in the United States. These studies have largely focused on the employment effects for low-
skilled workers – with the principal focus on teenagers. Overall, there is some controversy 
regarding whether disemployment effects exist, with some studies finding no effects,1 
although with more – and more diverse kinds of studies – finding evidence of disemployment 
effects.2  
In this study, we explore the extent to which minimum wages induce substitution 
away from workers whose jobs are more easily automated. For instance, employers may 
substitute away from labor with technological innovations – such as supermarkets 
substituting self-service checkout for cashiers, and assembly lines in manufacturing plants 
substituting robotic arms for workers. At the same time, firms may hire other workers who 
perform new tasks that are complementary with the new technology. For example, a firm 
using more robots may hire individuals to service, troubleshoot, and maintain these new 
machines. It seems reasonable to expect that the workers more likely to be replaced following 
minimum wage increases are those who are low skilled, earning wages affected by increases 
in the minimum wage, while workers who “tend” the machines are higher skilled. This 
suggests that there is a potential for labor reallocation away from jobs that are automatable 
following increases in the minimum wage, that low-skilled workers in automatable jobs are 
particularly vulnerable to minimum wage increases, and that the net disemployment effects 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Card and Kruger, 1994; Card and Kruger, 2000; Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010; 
Allegretto et al., 2011; and Addison, Blackburn and Cotti, 2012. 
2 See for example Neumark and Wascher, 1996; Neumark, 2001; Singell and Terborg, 2007; Neumark 
and Wascher, 2007; Thompson, 2009; Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen, 2012; Neumark, Salas, and 
Wascher, 2014a, 2014b; Clemens and Wither, 2016; Meer and West, 2015; Powell, 2016. Neumark 
(2017) reviews the very recent literature, pointing out the kinds of studies that find disemployment 
effects and the kinds that do not. 
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may be smaller than the gross effects that workers in automatable tasks experience.3  
We choose to focus on automation as it has been one of the dominant forces that has 
threatened low-skilled jobs in the United States in recent decades (Autor and Dorn, 2013; 
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2015), presumably because of both technological advances and 
reductions in the cost of technology that can substitute for low-skilled labor. Minimum wages 
can exacerbate these changes, when they raise price of low-skilled labor in automatable jobs, 
for which machines can be substituted.   
The main aim of this paper is to provide a richer understanding of how minimum 
wage policies have been shaping the type of employment held in the United States, within 
industries and for particular demographic groups. Specifically, we empirically assess whether 
the share of employment that is automatable declines in response to minimum wage 
increases. We focus on jobs that tend to be held by low-skilled workers, given that these are 
the jobs for which labor costs increase the most in relative terms following a minimum wage 
increase, which can prompt firms to substitute from people (low-skilled ones, in particular) 
towards machines. We complement our analyses of how the share of employment in 
automatable jobs responds to minimum wage increases with analyses of employment impacts 
for individual workers, estimating whether the probability that a low-skilled individual 
working in an automatable loses their job is larger following a minimum wage increase.  
Our analysis is related to concurrent research by Aaronson and Phelan (forthcoming), 
who, for the period 1999-2009, analyze the susceptibility of low-wage employment to 
technological substitution in the short run. Specifically, they focus on regressions that model 
the probability of being employed within the next two years against measures of the task 
                                                 
3 Of course, employers can respond to an increase in the minimum wage in a number of ways besides 
culling jobs. Other channels of adjustment that have been explored in the literature include changes in 
hours – where the empirical evidence is mixed (see Neumark and Washer, 2008, p. 78), job amenities 
(see Simon and Kaestner, 2004), prices (see Aaronson, 2001; Aaronson, French, and MacDonald, 
2008; Lemos, 2008; MaCurdy, 2015), and compression of wage differentials (see DiNardo, Fortin, 
and Lemieux, 1996; and Autor, Manning, and Smith, 2016). 
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content in an individual’s current job. They find that minimum wage increases lead to job 
losses for cognitively-routine jobs, but not manually-routine or non-routine jobs. Their study 
provides some evidence that firms may automate routine jobs in response to a minimum 
wage increase, reducing employment opportunities for workers in routine jobs.  
Our study contributes beyond this analysis in a number of ways. First, while 
Aaronson and Phelan (2017) are concerned with an average individual’s job loss, we focus on 
quantifying how shares in the employment of automatable tasks change following a 
minimum wage change, to provide more evidence on how the task composition of the 
workforce is affected.  
Second, we expect that automation is a viable and likely substitute for certain types of 
low-skilled jobs, and therefore also certain types of low-skilled labor, implying that average 
effects may mask significant heterogeneity. Therefore, our second contribution is to provide a 
full picture of labor market adjustments across industries and a variety of demographic 
groups, which can uncover these important differential responses. This may be of particular 
interest within the broader minimum wage literature. While that literature has largely focused 
on teenagers (and more recently restaurant workers), the perspective we adopt in this paper 
suggests there may be subgroups of workers among those groups not usually considered in 
the minimum wage literature who may be adversely affected by minimum wages, because 
they tend to be employed in automatable jobs.   
Third, for those who lose their jobs to automation following a minimum wage 
increase, we expect that the risk of not being able to find a similar job is greater for some 
groups as compared to others, and that an inability to do so has longer-term adverse 
consequences for earnings (and re-employment). Hence, we also analyze the effects of 
minimum wage increases on whether particular types of low-skilled individuals working in 
automatable jobs are more or less likely to stay in the same occupation following a minimum 
wage increase.  
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Together, our analyses provide the first evidence on how the shares of automatable 
jobs change following a minimum wage increase, and on the effects of minimum wages on 
groups that are very often ignored in the minimum wage literature, such as effects on older 
less-skilled workers who are in jobs where it is easier to replace people with machines.  
Our work is timely given that many U.S. states have continued to regularly raise their 
minimum wages, and a large number of additional states have newly implemented minimum 
wage laws (all higher than the federal minimum wage), with a number of states now indexing 
their minimum wages. As of January 7, 2017, 30 states (including the District of Columbia) 
had a minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25, ranging as high as $11 
in Washington State, and $11.50 in the District of Columbia.4 Moreover, many U.S. cities 
have implemented minimum wages, with the minimum wage in Seattle (and nearby Sea-Tac) 
reaching $15. Policy debate regarding these increases frequently references the literature on 
disemployment effects discussed above (a literature from which advocates on either side can 
pick evidence to support their view). But this literature largely focuses on teenagers, for 
whom employment effects are either irrelevant, or at best very tangentially related, to the 
more important policy question of whether higher minimum wages help low-income families. 
If employment changes in response to higher minimum wages mask larger gross effects for 
subgroups of low-skilled workers in automatable tasks – and in particular subgroups ignored 
in the existing minimum wage literature – then the reliance of policymakers on evidence for 
teenagers may be ignoring potentially adverse effects for older workers more likely to be 
major contributors to their families’ incomes.  
Our empirical analysis draws on CPS data from 1980-2015. We distinguish between 
occupations that are intensive in automatable tasks by drawing on definitions provided in 
Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor et al. (2015). We calculate for each industry within each 
                                                 
4 See https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (viewed February 1, 2017).  
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state-year cell an automatable employment share.5 The core of our analysis links these 
measures to changes in the relevant minimum wage.  
Overall, we find that increasing the minimum wage decreases significantly the share 
of automatable employment held by low-skilled workers. Our estimates suggest that an 
increase of the minimum wage by $1 (based on 2015 dollars) decreases the share of low-
skilled automatable jobs by 0.43 percentage point (an elasticity of −0.11). However, these 
average effects mask significant heterogeneity by industry and by demographic group. In 
particular, there are large effects on the shares of automatable employment in manufacturing, 
where we estimate that a $1 increase in the minimum wage decreases the share of 
automatable employment among low-skilled workers by 0.99 percentage point (elasticity of 
−0.17). Within manufacturing, the share of older workers in automatable employment 
declines most sharply, and the share of workers in automatable employment also declines 
sharply for women and blacks.  
Our analysis at the individual level draws many similar conclusions. We find that a 
significant number of individuals who were previously in automatable employment are 
unemployed in the period following a minimum wage increase. These effects are among the 
largest for individuals employed in the manufacturing industry, and are larger for the oldest 
and youngest workers, for females and for blacks. Overall, our analysis points to important 
heterogeneity in the employment effects of minimum wages, and highlights potentially 
adverse consequences of higher minimum wages for groups of workers that have not 
typically been considered in the extensive research literature on the employment effects of 
minimum wages. That is, the main message from our work is that groups often ignored in the 
minimum wage literature are in fact quite vulnerable to employment changes and job loss 
because of automation following a minimum wage increase.  
                                                 
5 We actually distinguish between urban and non-urban areas within each state.   
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Analysis of Shares of Employment in Automatable Jobs  
Methods 
Our analysis focuses on low-skilled individuals, who we define as having a high 
school diploma equivalent or less. The data we analyze cover this group only, for almost all 
of our analyses.  
We use data from Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor et al. (2015) to measure routine 
task intensity. In particular, routine task intensity in each three-digit occupation is defined as 
follows:  
        (1)  
where TkR, TkM, and TkA are the levels of routine, manual, and abstract task inputs for 
occupation k.6 Routine tasks involve a repeated sequence of actions, are easily codifiable, and 
therefore substitutable with technology. In contrast, manual tasks require actions that are not 
generally predictable in sequence, so substitution with technology is limited. To provide 
some examples, blue-collar jobs that are highly routine include machinists and typesetters.  
Jobs with low routine task intensity include bus driving and service station occupations. 
Blue-collar jobs that are classified as high on manual task intensity include taxi drivers, 
operating agents of construction equipment, and drivers of heavy vehicles, while meat cutters 
and upholsterers are low on this domain. Abstract tasks require high-level thinking that is 
more complementary with technology (Autor, 2013). Examples of low-skilled jobs that are 
high on abstract task intensity include supervisors of motor vehicle transportation, railroad 
conductors, and production foremen. Jobs that are low on abstract task intensity are garbage 
collectors, parking lot attendants, and packers. Thus, equation (1) is increasing in the absolute 
and relative quantity of tasks that are automatable within occupation k.  
                                                 
6 These levels are defined using variables from versions of the Dictionary of Occupation Titles, where 
incumbents are asked to grade the level of their occupation with respect to particular attributes,   
RTIk  ln(TkR ) ln(TkM ) ln(TkA )
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We further calculate for each industry i, within each area a (defined as state crossed 
by a metro dummy), in year t, a routine employment share, as follows:  
 RSHiat  ( (Liat ) 1[RTIk  RTI P66 ])( (Liat ))1
k1
K
k1
K  ,     (2)  
In equation (2), Liat is equal to total employment in industry i in area a at time t.  
is an indicator function taking the value of one if an occupation is in the top third of the 
employment-weighted distribution of RTI across occupations, using only low-skilled 
workers.  The numerator is then the share of automatable low-skill employment in a 
particular industry, area, and year, and the denominator is total low-skilled employment in 
that industry, location, and year.  
Our analysis initially focuses on the following specification: 
 RSHiat= b1MWst + Aa  + Tt +Ii  + iat   ,        (3)  
where MWst denotes the minimum wage in state s at time t. Equation (3) also includes area 
(Aa), year (Tt), and industry (Ii) fixed effects. Area is defined as state-specific dummy 
variables interacted with whether the individual lives in a metro area or not. Negative and 
significant estimates of b1 would imply that the share of employment that is automatable 
declines in response to minimum wage increases.7  
We next turn to disaggregating these effects across industries and demographic 
groups, in part to see whether there are sectors or groups particularly vulnerable to 
automation in response to minimum wage increases. In other work, differential patterns of 
task reallocation have been documented for various demographic groups. For example, less-
                                                 
7 We also augment equation (3) adding up to three lags of our minimum wage variable. The inclusion 
of lags allows for a period of adjustment to re-organize the factors of production away from labor and 
towards capital investments in technology. We note that in all models the lags are not significant, 
suggesting that investment in technology is relatively fast. As we discuss later, however, the 
minimum wage is defined based on the average minimum wage in the current and past 11 months, 
itself averaged over the year, so that the absence of lagged effects still allows effects that can arise 
over nearly two years.    
1[.]
8 
educated, male, and young workers have been the most susceptible to reductions in 
employment that is intensive in routine tasks (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor and Dorn, 2009). 
And other evidence indicates that less-educated individuals working in manufacturing are 
most vulnerable to employment loss caused by global trade (Bound and Holzer, 2000; 
Malamud and Wozniak, 2012). We therefore focus on differences in effects by age and sex, 
and we also examine differences by race.8 Specifically, for race we look at whites and blacks 
(we do not look at other categories given small cell sizes), and for age we look at aged 40 and 
over, those aged 25 or younger, and the intermediate group aged 26-39.  
To unpack the impact of minimum wage increases by age, sex, and race, we use 
measures of task intensity for each subgroup (indexed by c), as follows:  
RSHciat  ( (Lciat ) 1[RTIk  RTI P66 ])( (Lciat ))1
k1
K
k1
K  .9 (4) 
In this case the numerator is the share of automatable employment held by a particular 
sub-group in a specific industry, area, and year, and the denominator is total employment of a 
particular subgroup by industry, area, and year.  We estimate equation (3) for the separate 
subgroups, indexed by c, using RSH as defined in equation (4).   
There are two main sources of tasks that are routine intensive. The first are tasks 
found in blue-collar manufacturing occupations that are also capital intensive.  For example, 
automobiles are most often produced using conveyor belts. Workers perform tasks within this 
assembly line, which are routine and substitutable with robotic arms.  The second is 
codifiable administrative-support tasks that are typical to the inputs required in the financial 
service industries, among others (Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2015). The variation 
across industries in the proportion of individuals that are working in automatable 
8 The minimum wage literature also has many of examples of papers that consider variation in 
employment effects across subgroups. For example, gender (Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2016), age 
(Giuliano, 2012), and ethnicity (Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2011).  
9 RTIk and RTIP66 are computed as before, for all low-skilled workers.  
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employment, among low-skilled workers, is reported in Table 1. Finance, retail, 
manufacturing, and public administration have particularly high shares of low-skilled 
workers doing automatable tasks.  
We expect the minimum wage to change the share of employment in automatable 
tasks in differing degrees for particular industries. The impact directly relates to how 
dominant an automatable task type is in the industry in question, and the ease and cost of 
automating a task. To uncover whether there are differential effects by industry we estimate 
equation (3) separately by one-digit industry, in the aggregate (using RSH as defined in 
equation (2)), and by demographic group (using RSH as defined in equation (4)).  
Data 
Our main data source for our analysis of employment shares is pooled monthly CPS 
samples from 1980-2015. These data are matched to monthly state-level data on the 
minimum wage that was gathered by the authors. We allow for a period of adjustment by 
defining the minimum wage as the average over the current month plus the last 11 months. In 
addition, we do not include agriculture and mining in our sub-group analysis by industry, as 
we cannot meaningfully or reliably calculate RSHiat in many states or areas with a low 
representation of these industries. We then create our share of employment variable on a 
yearly basis, and similarly construct an annual average of the minimum wage variable.10  
 We rely on crosswalks provided by Autor and Dorn (2013) and Dorn (2009) to 
convert occupation codes in the CPS to a consistent coding system across years.11 The 
measure of routine task intensity (RTI) described in equation (1) is provided by Autor and 
                                                 
10 This choice is made for statistical reasons given that cell sizes are too small for accurate calculation 
of RSHiat on a monthly basis. In particular, cell sizes are too small for specific industries and 
demographic groups at a monthly basis. This level of analysis is also more intuitive given that 
substituting to automation requires some period of adjustment.  
11 Specifically, we follow Lordan and Pischke (2016) and match the currently relevant Census 
occupation code system (1980, 1990, 2000 or 2010) to the relevant Autor and Dorn crosswalk. This 
gives us a consistent coding system that can be matched directly to our measure of automatable tasks.  
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Dorn (2013) and is matched to the CPS data using this coding system. As noted earlier, we 
use data on individuals with a high school diploma equivalent or less. The first column of 
Table 1 reports the means, by industry, of the shares in automatable jobs 
Individual-Level Analysis 
Methods 
We also estimate regressions using individual-level data on low-skilled individuals. 
Specifically, we estimate the model:
     
 
 Empjiai+1=b1(RSHjiat∙MWat)+ b2RSHjiat +Tt∙Ss + Ii + jiat    ,         (5)  
where Emp is the probability that the jth person is employed in industry i, area a, at time t+1. 
It is assigned zero if a person was unemployed in t+1. The sample consists of those employed 
in period t, and either employed or unemployed (i.e., in the labor force) in period t+1. We 
could include transitions to non-employment as well, but we exclude them to capture the non-
employment most likely to be involuntary and hence related to the policy change (and the 
type of job in which one works). We can, we believe, more reliably interpret these transitions, 
for this sample, as reflecting job loss.  
Equation (5) relates this job loss to workers having held a routine job in period t, and 
facing a minimum wage increase. The coefficient on the interaction RSHjiat∙MWat – b1 – is 
therefore informative as to whether a person in automatable work is more vulnerable to job 
loss following a minimum wage increase. We can only look at those initially employed 
because we need to classify the routine task intensity of jobs, so we are capturing only flows 
out of employment and into unemployment.  
Note that equation (5) includes a full set of state-by-year interactions, to allow for 
differential time patterns across states; that is why Ss (for states) appears in the equation, 
rather than Aa (for areas), as in equation (3). Given the inclusion of the state-by-year 
interactions, the main effect MWst drops out of the equation, and identification of the 
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coefficient on the interaction comes from variation in the availability of automatable jobs 
within states across time.12  
All other definitions are consistent with equations (1) through (4). Under the 
expectation that individuals working in automatable jobs at the time of a minimum wage 
increase are more likely to have lost jobs by the next period as compared to individuals that 
are in jobs that are not automatable, we expect the coefficient on b1 to be negative and 
significant. We unpack heterogeneity in b1 by estimating equation (5) separately by industry 
and demographic subgroup.  
We complement these regressions with analyses that consider a dependent variable 
that equals one if an individual had the same occupation code in the interview year, and zero 
otherwise (including both the unemployed and job switchers, but again excluding those who 
leave the labor force). In these analyses, a negative and significant b1 presumably captures, to 
some extent, movements of labor out of employment in automatable tasks following a 
minimum wage increase (either to alternate work in non-automatable tasks or to not 
working).  
Data  
We estimate equation (5) using data from the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC) of the CPS. We focus only on individuals with a high school diploma 
equivalent or less, as in our shares analysis. The ASEC files are useful for our purposes 
because they collect information on the job held by respondents in the previous year at the 
                                                 
12 We cannot meaningfully document an effect of minimum wages on wages of those in automatable 
work, since this would restrict us only to those who are employed in both periods, and because the 
main effect of the minimum wage is subsumed in the fixed effects. Moreover, we do not necessarily 
expect a larger wage effect for those in automatable work; the substitution response may simply be 
larger. We did verify that in models for wages, the estimate of b1 is negative and significant. 
Assuming (as in past work) that minimum wages on average raise wages of low-skill workers, this 
suggests that the pay increase induced by a higher minimum wage for those in automatable work is 
not as high as for those in non-automatable work, which fits the story that automation reduces demand 
for those in automatable tasks and may increase demand for workers with different (and likely higher) 
skills.   
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three-digit occupation level. Thus, RSH is based on this occupation. The last two columns of 
Table 1 report the average probabilities that employed, low-skilled workers in automatable 
jobs remain employed, or in the same occupations (for those who remain in the labor force). 
Results  
Effects on Employment Shares 
The results from our share of employment analyses (equation (3)) are reported in 
Table 2. In the aggregate across all industries, as indicated in column (1), we find that 
minimum wage increases cause a statistically significant reallocation of labour away from 
automatable tasks. We find that a $1 increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.43 
percentage point decrease in the share of automatable jobs done by low-skilled workers. The 
implied elasticity (computed across observations and then averaged) is −0.10. When we look 
separately at the construction, wholesale, retail, and finance industries, the estimates are 
centered around zero and are not significant. In contrast, the effects are significant and often 
substantive in other industries. Specifically, the estimates imply that a minimum wage 
increase of $1 causes a 0.99 percentage point decrease in the share of automatable jobs done 
by low-skilled workers in manufacturing (implied elasticity is −0.17). The estimates also 
suggest a substantive effect in public administration, although the estimate is not statistically 
significant.  
Table 3 presents our analysis of the effects of the minimum wage on the share of 
employment in automatable jobs, broken down by demographic group. The table reveals that 
there is significant heterogeneity in these effects beyond the differences by industry 
documented in Table 2. For example, a higher minimum wage significantly reduces the 
shares of both younger (≤ 25) and older (> 40) workers in jobs that are automatable, by a 
larger magnitude compared to those aged 26-39. For the younger and older groups, the 
estimates imply that a $1 increase in the minimum wage reduces the shares in automatable 
work by 0.94 and 0.72 percentage points respectively (the corresponding elasticities are 
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−0.20 and −0.17. Looking by both age and industry, for older workers (≥ 40 years old) the 
negative effect mainly arises in the manufacturing and public administration sectors (a 
decrease of 1.68 and 3.50 percentage points for a $1 minimum wage increase respectively), 
while for younger workers (< 25 years old) the effects are large in many sectors but the 
estimate is close to zero for manufacturing. The middle age group, also, exhibits a decline in 
the share of workers in automatable jobs in manufacturing when the minimum wage 
increases – a 1.21 percentage point decline for a $1 increase. Thus, older workers appear 
more vulnerable to substitution away from automatable jobs when the minimum wage 
increases.  
On average, females are affected more adversely than males: in the aggregate 
estimates in column (1), the negative estimate is significant only for females, and is almost 
ten times larger, indicating that, for females, a minimum wage increase of $1 causes a 
decrease of 1.01 percentage points in the share of automatable jobs (the elasticity is −0.14).  
Across industries, these negative effects for females are concentrated in manufacturing, 
services, and public administration; for example, a $1 minimum wage increase reduces the 
share of automatable jobs in public administration by 3.67 percentage points – an elasticity of 
−0.41). For males, only the estimate for manufacturing is statistically significant; the 
estimated effect implies that a $1 increase in the minimum wage causes a decrease of 0.62 
percentage point (an elasticity of −0.13).  
Table 3 also points to similar overall effects by race, with a $1 increase in the 
minimum wage reducing the share in automatable jobs by 0.57 percentage point for whites 
and 0.72 percentage point for blacks.13 However, the effects are heterogeneous across 
industries. There are large estimated effects in manufacturing (1.19 percentage points) and 
public administration (1.53 percentage points) for whites, although only the first estimate is 
                                                 
13 Implied elasticities evaluated at the mean are −0.13 and −0.16 respectively.  
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statistically significant.  For blacks, there are large and statistically significant decreases in 
automatable shares in manufacturing and transport (declines of about 4.5 percentage point in 
both).  
Effects on Remaining Employed 
The estimates in Table 3 are consistent with substitution away from labor doing 
routine tasks in response to minimum wage increases, in a number of industries (depending 
on the demographic group). However, this evidence does not necessarily imply that those 
previously in automatable jobs become unemployed. It is possible that the decline in the 
share of employment in automatable tasks comes about from a reduction in employment in 
automatable tasks and an increase in employment in less routine tasks, although this seems 
unlikely if the latter jobs are higher skilled, except perhaps for some subgroups.   
To study directly whether a higher minimum wage increases unemployment among 
low-skilled workers who were in jobs with routine tasks, Table 4 reports estimates of 
equation (5), which models the effects of minimum wage increases on the probability a 
particular individual who holds an automatable job is still employed in the next period, as 
opposed to unemployed. Overall, we find evidence indicating that the negative effects on 
employment shares in automatable jobs reported in Tables 2 and 3 are associated with job 
loss and transitions to unemployment among workers initially doing automatable jobs.  
First, looking across industries in the pooled estimates in column (1), we find 
evidence of significant declines in the probability of remaining employed – and hence 
transitioning to unemployed – for those who were previously in automatable employment. 
Second, there is some correspondence in the estimated effects by industry, with a strong 
decline for the pooled data evident for manufacturing, and a large point estimate for public 
administration (although significant). Third, the pattern of heterogeneity in estimated effects 
by demographic group is also similar in some respects to the estimated effects on shares 
reported in Table 3, with the youngest and oldest workers adversely affected, and females 
 15 
 
more adversely affected than males.  
In terms of magnitudes, the pooled estimates imply that a $1 minimum wage increase 
lowers the probability that a worker in automatable employment remains employed by 0.12 
percentage point;14 the percentage point effect on the probability of unemployment is of 
course then an increase of 0.12 percentage point. The effect in manufacturing is about 50 
percent larger, consistent with the large effect for manufacturing reported in Table 2. The 
services estimate implies that a $1 minimum wage increase lowers the probability of 
remaining in employment by 0.15 percentage point. None of the other full sample estimates 
by industry are statistically significant, although the estimate for finance is sizable – of 
roughly the same magnitude as the effect for manufacturing.  
Looking at effects for manufacturing by age, there are adverse employment effects for 
both the oldest and youngest groups, with an implied decline in the probability of 
employment, from a $1 minimum wage increase, of 0.28 percentage point and 0.78 
percentage point, respectively. Similarly, there is evidence of declining employment 
(increased job loss) in services for those aged 25 or younger (0.42 percentage point), and for 
those over 40 years old (0.33 percentage point).   
Looking at males and females separately, the estimates parallel those for the share in 
automatable employment in Table 3, indicating sharper employment declines for women than 
for men (a decline of 0.19 versus 0.13 percentage point), with the effect more strongly 
statistically significant for women. However, for men there is statistically significant 
evidence of a decline in employment in manufacturing (0.20 percentage point), and a 
marginally significant decline in services. For females, there is also evidence of 
heterogeneity, with sharp negative effects in manufacturing (0.67 percentage point) and retail 
(0.39 percentage point).  
                                                 
14 Given that all observations in the individual-level analysis are initially employed, the estimated 
coefficients are easily interpreted as percent declines as well, so we do not report elasticities.   
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Finally, looking at the estimated effects by race, for low-skilled whites there is 
evidence (significant at the 10-percent level) of increased job loss in manufacturing, with a 
$1 increase in the minimum wage reducing by 0.17 percentage point the probability of 
remaining employed in the next period. For low-skilled blacks, the evidence of negative 
employment effects is statistically significant only for transportation, although there are large 
(but insignificant) negative estimates for many industries; note that the standard errors for 
blacks are much larger.  
Effects on Occupational Switching 
Table 5 reports similar estimates, but now the dependent variable is equal to one if an 
individual stayed in the same occupation in the subsequent period, and zero otherwise.  As in 
Table 4, the sample includes those employed in period t and in the labor force in period t+1; 
in addition, those employed have to have valid occupation codes. Thus, the estimated effect 
of the minimum wage-routine interaction captures the change in job opportunities in the 
worker’s initial occupation, with a “decline” captured in either non-employment or a change 
of occupations.  
Overall, there are many more larger, significant, and negative effects reported in 
Table 5, suggesting that higher minimum wages lead to a good deal of occupational 
switching among low-skilled workers in automatable jobs, in addition to transitions to 
unemployment; this occupational switching is presumably another cost of higher minimum 
wages for these workers. In addition, the evidence of such effects within industries suggests 
there is substantial re-allocation of labor within industries because of the minimum wage 
increase.  
Turning to some specific magnitudes, the estimates imply that a $1 increase in the 
minimum wage leads, overall, to a 0.50 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
holding the same occupation. The effects are largest in transportation (1.39 percentage 
points), services (1.08 percentage points), and finance (0.78 percentage point), and also 
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negative and significant in manufacturing (0.25 percentage point). In Table 5, in contrast to 
the earlier tables, the estimated negative effects are sometimes sizable and significant for 
workers aged 26-39 – in particular, for transportation (1.24 percentage points), finance (1.34 
percentage points), and services (1.14 percentage points). For younger workers (aged 25 and 
under), as well, the estimates are often large and negative.  In contrast, for older workers 
these negative effects are more modest (compare, e.g., the estimated effects for 
transportation, finance, and services). The differences by age when we look at employment 
declines overall versus the combined effects of minimum wages on switching occupations or 
becoming unemployed suggest that younger and middle-aged workers in automatable jobs 
are more able to respond to higher minimum wages by switching occupations, whereas older 
workers are not.   
Comparing effects for females and males, the estimated overall negative impact of 
minimum wages on workers in automatable jobs remaining employed in the same occupation 
is larger for women (0.69 versus 0.54 percentage point). There are more substantial 
differences across industries. And the effects are much larger for whites than for blacks (0.50 
versus 0.15 percentage point, with the effect not significant for blacks). This difference by 
race may imply that blacks in automatable jobs are less able to change jobs in response to 
minimum wage increases, like older workers.  The effect for whites arises in manufacturing, 
transportation, finance, and services, while there is only a significant (and negative) effect for 
blacks in transportation.  
Hours Effects  
Our analysis so far has focused on employment. However, there is also a potential for 
hours to decrease in automatable employment following a minimum wage increase. We 
consider hours explicitly by re-estimating equation (3) and relating minimum wage variation 
to an alternate dependent variable. Here, the dependent variable is the share of hours worked 
among low-skill workers in automatable employment, in a particular industry, area, and year. 
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We also re-estimate equation (5) with the difference in reported usual hours worked between 
this year and last year by an individual as the dependent variable. We focus only on those 
who are employed in the two periods, with positive hours worked.   
The results from these analyses are reported in Table 6. The pooled estimates imply 
that a minimum wage increase of $1 causes a 0.33 percentage point decrease in the share of 
hours in automatable jobs done by low-skilled workers overall. The estimated decline in 
manufacturing is 1.03 percentage points. The share of hours analysis suggests that females 
are most affected (although the estimate for females is not statistically significant), along 
with older workers and the youngest workers (as compared to 26-39 year-olds).  
The individual-level analysis considers the difference in the usual hours worked per 
week between period 1 and period 2. The data for both periods are recalled in the same 
interview period. By construction, the sample only includes individuals who kept their jobs 
between the two periods, so the sample sizes are lower than for the employment regressions. 
There is also loss due to non-response on the “hours worked last year” question.  The 
estimates reported in the second panel of Table 6 suggest significant decreases in hours 
worked for those initially in automatable jobs following a minimum wage increase. Based on 
the pooled estimate, a $1 increase in the minimum wage generates a 0.23 decrease in hours 
worked for low-skilled individuals who held an automatable job in the previous period. The 
decline is negative and statistically significant in manufacturing, transport, wholesale, retail, 
and services (sometimes only at the 10-percent level). Overall, the results indicate that those 
in automatable low-skilled work are vulnerable to hours reductions following a minimum 
wage increase.     
Across demographic groups, the estimated coefficients are mostly significant and 
negative. For example, a $1 increase in the minimum wage is estimated to reduce hours 
worked for low-skilled males who held an automatable job in the previous period by 0.17. 
For females the decrease is 0.1 hours. Low-skilled workers aged 26-39 and 40+ years have 
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similar decreases in hours in response to a $1 increase (about 0.25 hours); the coefficient for 
individuals aged 25 or below is closer to zero and not significant. White low-skilled workers 
who held an automatable job in the previous period have a decrease of about 0.26 hours in 
response to a $1 increase. However, there is no significant decrease for low-skilled blacks.  
Are the Effects Stronger in More Recent Data?  
It is interesting to re-estimate these models using a shorter, more-recent time period, 
at the risk of losing observations, given that the move towards automation has likely 
accelerated over time, as technology has been getting cheaper, and labor more expensive. To 
this end, in Table 7 we report estimates covering 1995-2016, rather than going back to 1980. 
(We do not report estimates by industry crossed with demographic subgroups.) Comparisons 
with Tables 2-5 reveal that the overall estimates are generally stronger in the more recent sub 
period. This suggests that the substitution response to minimum wages was higher in more-
recent years, likely because of increased ease of automation (and perhaps minimum wages 
reaching higher levels). However, individuals who are getting a high school diploma or less 
are also changing over time, with people on average now getting higher levels of education. 
Therefore, there is a risk that negative selection into our definition of the low-skilled also 
partially explains the strengthening of the results in the most recent time period.  
In the pooled analysis for the share of employment in automatable jobs, we find that a 
$1 increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.57 percentage point decrease in this share 
(compared to a 0.43 percentage point decrease from Table 2). We note that the manufacturing 
estimate is attenuated slightly (0.85 percentage point, versus 0.99 percentage point in Table 3, 
which translates into an implied elasticity of −0.14, versus −0.17). However, the estimates 
also imply that a minimum wage increase of $1 causes a 1.18 percentage point decrease in 
the share of automatable jobs done by low-skilled workers in transport (as compared to a 0.76 
percentage point decrease in Table 2), and a 2.08 percentage point decrease in public 
administration (as compared to a 1.77 percentage point decrease in Table 2).  
 20 
 
The subgroups of individuals that are the most affected largely remain the same as in 
the full-period estimates in Table 3. A higher minimum wage affects older (≥ 40), younger (≤ 
25), and female workers in jobs that are automatable to the greatest extent.  
Table 7 also reports estimates of the effects of a minimum wage increase on the 
probability that an individual who holds an automatable job remains employed in the next 
period, versus becoming unemployed. These estimates are also larger compared to the full-
sample estimates (Table 4). The pooled estimates imply that a $1 minimum wage increase 
lowers the probability that a worker in automatable employment remains employed by 0.40 
percentage point. The effect in manufacturing is 0.68 percentage point. Overall, the pattern of 
results is qualitatively similar to that documented in Table 4, and those whose employment 
probabilities decline the most following a minimum wage increase are generally the same 
(except for whites and blacks). 
A similar conclusion is drawn if we consider the analysis where the dependent 
variable is equal to one if an individual stayed in the same occupation in the subsequent 
period. These analyses suggest that higher minimum wages lead to occupational switching, 
alongside job loss, among low-skilled workers in automatable jobs. Specifically, the pooled 
estimates imply that a $1 increase in the minimum wages leads, overall, to a 0.90 percentage 
point decrease (compared to 0.50 percentage point in Table 5) in the probability of holding 
the same occupation in the next period. Consistent with Table 5, the effects are largest in 
transportation and services. In contrast, the estimate for finance is much smaller in Table 7 as 
compared to Table 5. For Table 7 (as in Table 5), the estimated negative effect is sizable for 
workers aged 26-39; however, the estimate is still largest for the youngest workers. Overall, 
the comparison of the estimates in Table 7 with the earlier estimates indicates that the 
substitution response towards automation in place of low-skilled workers in response to a 
minimum wage increase is stronger in more recent years.  
Probing the Effects in Manufacturing 
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Returning to Tables 3-5, many of our results by industry pointed to declines in the 
share of automatable jobs, and increased job loss, in manufacturing. These types of findings 
are unusual in the minimum wage literature, which usually focuses on very low-skilled 
workers (hence the emphasis on teenagers, for example). Then again, our analysis does not 
focus on manufacturing in the aggregate, but on low-skilled workers in automatable jobs. 
Nonetheless, if the effects we estimate in manufacturing are in fact driven by minimum wage 
increases, they should be generated from low-wage rather than high-wage workers.  
To that end, we estimate our key results for higher-wage and lower-wage workers in 
the manufacturing industry, based on wages in occupations within manufacturing. For each 
low-skill occupation (defined as having a majority presence of low-skilled workers15) within 
manufacturing, we compute average wages from the 1980-2016 Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups of the CPS. The low-wage subsample is then defined as the bottom tertile of 
occupations in this distribution, and the high-wage subsample as the top tertile. These 
definitions are then matched to the data used for the analyses in Tables 3-5, and separate 
analyses of equations (3) and (5) are conducted for the two sub-samples. Examples of 
occupations that fall into the high-wage and low-wage categories under this definition are 
given in Table 8. Those occupations classified as low wage are typically machine operators 
of some description; in contrast, high-wage earners more commonly maintain and install 
machinery.16 Notably, those in these low-wage occupations in the bottom tertile regularly 
earn wages at or near the minimum wage.   
                                                 
15 In practice we calculate the proportion of low-skilled workers in each occupation. Those with 
shares greater than 0.5 are defined as being low-skilled occupations.  
16 We consider an alternative definition whereby for each low-skill sub-industry (at the two-digit 
level) within manufacturing, we compute average wages from the 1980-2016 Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Groups of the CPS. The low-wage sub-sample is the bottom tertile of industries in this 
distribution, and the high-wage subsample is the top tertile. These definitions are again matched to the 
data used for the previous analyses. The results are shown in Appendix A. As compared to Table 9, 
the estimates are often slightly attenuated, although the overall conclusions are the same.  
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The estimates in Table 9 are strongly consistent with the adverse effects of minimum 
wages on the share of employment in automatable jobs arising from low-wage jobs. 
Specifically, the coefficient estimates for the high-wage regressions are small, mostly not 
significant, and mainly centered around zero. In contrast, the coefficients in the models for 
low-wage jobs are sizable and significant for the pooled model, for the employment share in 
automatable jobs, as well as for many sub-groups. The estimates in the top panel of Table 9, 
in column (1), imply that a $1 increase in the minimum wage leads to a 2.03 percentage point 
decrease in the share of automatable jobs done by low-skilled, low-wage workers in 
manufacturing. This effect is substantial for males and females, and for whites and blacks, 
but is smaller and insignificant for the youngest workers.  
The estimates in Table 9 also indicate that a $1 minimum wage increase reduces the 
employment probability of workers originally in automatable jobs. For low-wage jobs, we 
find significant negative effects for all age groups (largest for the young), and for females. 
Table 9 also provides evidence consistent with some workers who are in automatable 
employment being less likely to hold the same job in the next period; most of the estimates 
are negative, but none are significant.  
Interestingly, in both of the individual-level analyses, we find positive effects for 
females in higher-wage jobs. This suggests that employment prospects for some workers in 
higher-wage occupations are boosted by minimum wage increases, consistent with a story in 
which some jobs are lost to automation, while others are created. However, those that are 
created are for higher-wage workers among the lower-skilled workers, and perhaps – given 
that result emerges for women – among jobs less likely to involve manual or physically-
demanding labor. This is also consistent with the jobs represented in the top and bottom wage 
tertiles listed in Table 8. For instance, operators (more likely to be male) can be replaced with 
robotic arms, but the robotic arms need maintenance and troubleshooting.  
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Conclusions  
This study empirically assesses whether there is labor reallocation away from 
automatable employment following increases in the minimum wage, and how this 
reallocation affects the type of employment held in the United States, within industries and 
for particular demographic groups. We focus specifically on jobs that tend to be held by low-
skilled workers, for which labor costs increase the most in response to minimum wage 
increases. We estimate the impact of minimum wage increases on the share of low-skilled 
employment in automatable jobs, and on the probability that a low-skilled individual working 
in an automatable job stays employed (or in the same occupation), declines following a 
minimum wage increase. We explore and document considerable heterogeneity in these 
effects across demographic groups, and across industries. The analysis goes beyond the types 
of workers usually considered in the conventional, long-standing research on the employment 
effects of minimum wages, such as teenagers – studying, for example, the effects of 
minimum wages on older less-skilled workers who are in jobs where it is easier to replace 
people with machines.  
Based on CPS data from 1980-2015, we find that increasing the minimum wage 
decreases significantly the share of automatable employment held by low-skilled workers. 
The average effects mask significant heterogeneity by industry and demographic group. For 
example, one striking result is that the share in automatable employment declines most 
sharply for older workers. An analysis of individual transitions from employment to 
unemployment (or to employment in a different occupation) leads to similar overall 
conclusions, and also some evidence of adverse effects for older workers in particular 
industries. Overall, our analysis points to important heterogeneity in the employment effects 
of minimum wages for worker in automatable jobs, and suggests that groups often ignored in 
the minimum wage literature are in fact quite vulnerable to job loss because of automation 
following a minimum wage increase.  
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Our work suggests that sharp minimum wage increases in the United States in coming 
years will shape the types of jobs held by low-skilled workers, and create employment 
challenges for some of them. Our findings identify some workers on whom the more general 
minimum wage literature is silent, but who are vulnerable to substitution of machines for 
people. Given data limitations, we cannot address the permanence of the effects. However, 
the decision to use labor-saving technology seems likely to be relatively permanent, 
especially if – as is becoming increasingly common – minimum wages are indexed so that a 
minimum wage increase results in permanently higher relative costs of low-skilled labor 
(Sorkin, 2015).   
We have followed the definitions of automatable work as provided by Autor and Dorn 
(2013). These are very useful definitions for a retrospective analysis, given that the 
occupations identified as automatable are highly credible. However, in the future many more 
occupations that employ low-skill workers are on track to be automated, even if they are not 
currently labelled as ‘automatable.’ These include, for example, taxi drivers,17 cashiers,18 and 
bricklayers.19 Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that increases in minimum wage will 
give incentives for firm to adopt new technologies that replace workers earlier. While these 
adoptions undoubtedly lead to some new jobs, there are workers who will be displaced that 
do not have the skills to do the new tasks. Our paper has identified workers whose 
vulnerability to being replaced by machines has been amplified by minimum wage increases. 
Such effects may spread to more workers in the future. 
 
 
                                                 
17 For example, Uber is currently troubleshooting their driverless car.  
18 There is increasing use of innovations in app technology that allow customers to help themselves to 
the products they need, pay online and never see a cashier or checkout. This technology has already 
been adopted for low-value purchases in Apple Stores and in Amazon GO (Amazon’s new grocery 
store).   
19 For example, Fastbrick Robotics has now developed Hadrian X – a robot that lays 1,000 standard 
bricks in 60 minutes.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variable  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The average minimum wage is $6.77 in 2015 dollars.  
 
 
 
Shares of 
automatable 
employment 
P(employed in 
next period | 
initially in 
automatable 
job) 
P(employed in next 
period in same 
occupation | initially 
in automatable job) 
Total routine  30% 0.92 0.86 
Construction  5% 0.92 0.88 
Manufacturing  41% 0.88 0.88 
Transport  22% 0.95 0.92 
Wholesale  26% 0.92 0.88 
Retail  40% 0.91 0.83 
Finance  39% 0.95 0.89 
Services  32% 0.92 0.88 
P. Adm.  37% 0.96 0.90 
Male  19% 0.91 0.87 
Female  51% 0.92 0.85 
≥ 40 years old 29% 0.89 0.86 
26-39 years old 28% 0.95 0.89 
≤ 25 years old 31% 0.88 0.79 
White  29% 0.92 0.87 
Black   31% 0.87 0.86 
  
 
 
 
Table 2: Full Sample Estimates, Shares of Employment in Automatable Jobs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manufacturing Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Dependent Variable = Share of  Automatable Employment  
Min Wage         -0.0043 0.0005 -0.0099 -0.0076 0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0072 -0.0177 
 (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0062) (0.0033) (0.0085) (0.0050) (0.0133) 
N 30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
Notes: OLS coefficient estimates are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by State. Low-skilled workers are defined as those who have a high 
school diploma equivalent or less. The definition of automatable employment is provided by Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor Dorn and Hanson (2015). A job is classified as 
automatable at the three-digit occupation code level. The share of automatable employment is calculated by industry, state, and year. The share of automatable hours worked is 
calculated in the same manner. All regressions include area (state x metro) and year fixed effects. The pooled regression also has industry fixed effects. The minimum wage is 
measured in 2015 dollars.  
  
Table 3: Disaggregated Estimates,  Shares of Employment in Automatable Jobs  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manufacturing Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
≥ 40 Years Old     
Min Wage  -0.0072 0.0015 -0.0168 -0.0033 0.0013 -0.0100 0.0084 0.0015 -0.0350 
 (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0100) (0.0084) (0.0149) (0.0070) (0.0172) (0.0081) (0.0141) 
N 30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
26-39 Years Old 
Min Wage  -0.0049 0.0001 -0.0121 -0.0066 -0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0094 -0.0134 
  (0.0036) (0.0077) (0.0059) (0.0096) (0.0065) (0.0098) (0.0067) (0.0135) (0.013) 
N  30963  3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
≤ 25 Years Old     
Min Wage  -0.0094  0.0027 -0.0020 -0.0138 -0.0084 -0.0019 -0.0217 -0.0128 -0.0142 
 (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0102) (0.0115) (0.0158) (0.0047) (0.0146) (0.0048) (0.0208) 
N 30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
Males   
Min Wage  -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0062 0.0013 0.0087 -0.0072 0.0050 -0.0028 0.0035 
  (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0063) (0.0055) (0.0126) (0.0043) (0.0075) 
N  30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
Females   
Min Wage  -0.0105 0.0085 -0.0248 -0.0082 0.0003 0.0002 0.0112 -0.0118 -0.0367 
   (0.0038) (0.0118) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0148) (0.0044) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0142) 
N  30963 3157 3157 3152 3147 3157 3138 3156 3060  
White           
Min Wage  -0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0119  -0.0011 0.0042 -0.0005  -0.0002 -0.0075 -0.0153 
  (0.0023) (0.029) (0.0061) (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0047) (0.0111) (0.0050) (0.0150) 
N  30963 3157 3157 3152 3141 3157 3138 3156 3150 
Black              
Min Wage  -0.0072  0.0004 -0.0458 -0.0452 0.0130 0.0196 -0.0182 0.0027 0.0086 
  (0.0048)  (0.0062) (0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0235) (0.0164) (0.0253) (0.0153) (0.0194) 
N  22800 2273 2538 2274 1891 2730 1782 2787 2105 
Notes: See notes to Table 2.   
  
Table 4: Probability of Being Employed in the Next Period, for those Initially in Automatable Job   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Full Sample  
Min Wage    -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0018 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0018 
   x Routine (0.0004) (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0017) 
Routine  0.0089 0.0810 0.0044 0.0157 -0.0094 -0.0177 0.0302 0.0188 -0.0000 
 (0.0016) (0.0110) (0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0093) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0033) (0.0057) 
N 956232 88957 242539 68224 36844 166940 47750 240142 42854 
≥ 40 Years Old 
Min Wage    -0.0026 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0018 
   x Routine (0.0007) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0035) 
Routine  0.0160 0.0781 0.0089 0.0275 -0.0029 -0.0138 0.0467 0.0312 0.0152 
 (0.0025) (0.0142) (0.0046) (0.0070) (0.0157) (0.0090) (0.0117) (0.0058) (0.0126) 
N 403189  36220 108634  32975  15538  52278  20610  104844  22842  
26-39 Years Old 
Min Wage   -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0003 0.0007 
   x Routine (0.0008) (0.0043) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0030) 
Routine  0.0068 0.0673 -0.0022 0.0151 -0.0047 -0.0139 0.0265 0.0108 -0.0020 
 (0.0028) (0.0159) (0.0046) (0.0069) (0.0160) (0.0100) (0.0085) (0.0041) (0.0099) 
N 328683 34750 88997 25652 13727 47033 16600 79412 14540 
< 25 Years Old  
Min Wage    -0.0052 -0.0021 -0.0079 -0.0016 0.0034 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0042 0.0082 
   x Routine (0.0013) (0.0087) (0.0025) (0.0060) (0.0076) (0.0027) (0.0081) (0.0029) (0.0102) 
Routine  0.0322 0.1065 0.0338 0.0630 -0.0044 -0.0099 0.0729 0.0437 0.0387 
 (0.0045) (0.0325) (0.0082) (0.0177) (0.0279) (0.0107) (0.0301) (0.0112) (0.0304) 
N 224360 17987 44908 9597 7579 67629 10540 55886 5472 
Males           
Min Wage    -0.0013 -0.0042 -0.0020 0.0014 -0.0035 0.0037 0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0015 
   x Routine (0.0007) (0.0050) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0025) 
Routine  0.0022 0.0557 -0.0007 0.0109 0.0007 -0.0444 0.0258 0.0154 0.0103 
 (0.0025) (0.0167) (0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0137) (0.0076) (0.0106) (0.0075) (0.0069) 
N 534311 83224 156879 52227 25701 77921 13665 82106 24064 
Females           
Min Wage    -0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0067 0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0031 
   x Routine (0.0006) (0.0066) (0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0026) 
Routine  0.0145 0.1118 0.0330 -0.0006 0.0066 0.0047 0.0207 0.0144 0.0172 
 (0.0022) (0.0272) (0.0059) (0.0120) (0.0142) (0.0075) (0.0097) (0.0029) (0.0103) 
N 421921 5733 85660 15997 11143 89019 34085 158036 18790 
White           
Min Wage    -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0017 0.0015 0.0011 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0009 
   x Routine (0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0019) 
Routine  0.0068 0.0698 0.0048 0.0102 -0.0129 -0.0159 0.0188 0.0144 -0.0017 
 (0.0017) (0.0113) (0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0091) (0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0030) (0.0069) 
N 824135 80827 211855 59242 33225 147053 42306 194902 34351 
Black            
Min Wage   -0.0022 0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0120 -0.0174 -0.0074 -0.0104 -0.0032 0.0010 
   x Routine (0.0017) (0.0137) (0.0026) (0.0056) (0.0131) (0.0056) (0.0082) (0.0017) (0.0050) 
Routine  0.0052 0.1490 -0.0196 0.0623 0.0481 0.0078 0.0788 0.0071 0.0039 
 (0.0062) (0.0558) (0.0095) (0.0204) (0.0496) (0.0173) (0.0291) (0.0065) (0.0158) 
N 104510 6141 24830 7522 2745 13921 4264 37204 6922 
Notes: See also notes to Table 2. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if a person is employed in t+1, 0 if they are unemployed.  
All regressions include state x year fixed effects and a metropolitan area dummy variable. 
  
 
Table 5: Probability of Being Employed in the Same Occupation in the Next Period, for those Initially in 
Automatable Job   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Pooled Construction Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Full Sample  
Min Wage    -0.0050 -0.0075 -0.0025 -0.0139 -0.0037 0.0033 -0.0078 -0.0108 0.0029 
   x Routine (0.0006) (0.0048) (0.0010) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0028) 
Routine  0.0140 0.0538 0.0011 0.0376 -0.0069 -0.0335 0.0309 0.0482 -0.0132 
 (0.0021) (0.0194) (0.0031) (0.0084) (0.0133) (0.0065) (0.0102) (0.0036) (0.0101) 
N 894885 75561 226891 64580 35439 154317 46879 229714 41846 
≥ 40 Years Old 
Min Wage    -0.0045 -0.0048 -0.0019 -0.0057 -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0075 0.0056 
   x Routine (0.0006) (0.0054) (0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0038) 
Routine  0.0121 0.0190 0.0012 0.0117 -0.0014 -0.0000 0.0092 0.0301 -0.0195 
 (0.0024) (0.0197) (0.0047) (0.0131) (0.0168) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0049) (0.0137) 
N 385809  32647 105222 31910 15277 49025 20523 102706 22601 
26-39 Years Old 
Min Wage   -0.0061 -0.0095 -0.0037 -0.0124 0.0001 0.0028 -0.0134 -0.0114 0.0007 
   x Routine (0.0010) (0.0071) (0.0022) (0.0042) (0.0059) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0018) (0.0041) 
Routine  0.0191 0.0332 0.0069 0.0360 -0.0089 -0.0299 0.0610 0.0502 -0.0126 
 (0.0037) (0.0270) (0.0077) (0.0156) (0.0225) (0.0142) (0.0170) (0.0071) (0.0139) 
N 307294  28867 83304 23948 13106 44595 16369 75399 14317 
< 25 Years Old  
Min Wage    -0.0102 -0.0155 -0.0049 -0.0516 -0.0235 0.0076 -0.0447 -0.0125 -0.0219 
   x Routine (0.0017) (0.0157) (0.0032) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0053) (0.0122) (0.0034) (0.0178) 
Routine  0.0499 0.1435 0.0192 0.1804 0.0536 -0.0316 0.2259 0.0771 0.1189 
 (0.0059) (0.0565) (0.0108) (0.0324) (0.0390) (0.0127) (0.0399) (0.0131) (0.0529) 
N 201782 14047 38365 8722 7056 60697 9987 51609 4928 
Males           
Min Wage    -0.0054 -0.0210 -0.0037 -0.0147 0.0067 0.0013 -0.0069 -0.0184 0.0042 
   x Routine (0.0008) (0.0078) (0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0042) 
Routine  -0.0027 0.0631 -0.0006 0.0225 -0.0605 -0.0962 0.0074 0.0537 -0.0339 
 (0.0031) (0.0273) (0.0049) (0.0134) (0.0191) (0.0111) (0.0166) (0.0104) (0.0129) 
N 496746 70365 148313 49454 24852 72440 13707 77673 23537 
Females           
Min Wage    -0.0069 -0.0359 -0.0014 -0.0090 -0.0169 -0.0013 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0133 
   x Routine (0.0008) (0.0135) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0042) 
Routine  0.0196 0.1938 -0.0022 0.0484 0.0668 0.0092 0.0162 0.0306 0.0661 
 (0.0030) (0.0575) (0.0087) (0.0157) (0.0239) (0.0084) (0.0123) (0.0049) (0.0179) 
N 398139 5196 78578 15126 10587 81877 33172 152041 18309 
White           
Min Wage    -0.0050 -0.0062 -0.0026 -0.0119 -0.0042 0.0026 -0.0082 -0.0125 0.0044 
   x Routine (0.0006) (0.0049) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0030) 
Routine  0.0157 0.0463 0.0019 0.0317 -0.0042 -0.0336 0.0352 0.0607 -0.0185 
 (0.0022) (0.0198) (0.0033) (0.0090) (0.0126) (0.0073) (0.0109) (0.0036) (0.0104) 
N 775940 69074 199529 56349 32120 137111 41793 187723 33962 
Black            
Min Wage   -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0284 -0.0041 -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0018 -0.0009 
   x Routine (0.0018) (0.0347) (0.0051) (0.0085) (0.0206) (0.0059) (0.0074) (0.0040) (0.0093) 
Routine  -0.0102 -0.0066 -0.0278 0.0767 -0.0377 -0.0138 -0.0340 -0.0172 0.0019 
 (0.0068) (0.1374) (0.0168) (0.0314) (0.0704) (0.0226) (0.0286) (0.0172) (0.0328) 
N 93549 4879 21995 6905 2479 11655 3967 34427 6445 
Notes:  See notes to Table 2. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if a person is employed in the same occupation in t+1, 0 if they are 
unemployed or in another occupation. Samples are smaller than in Table 4 because all respondents needed to have a valid occupation 
code in period t, and respondents who stayed employed in period t and period t+1 need to have a valid occupation code in both periods. 
Those who do not meet these criteria are excluded from the sample.   
  
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Hours Analysis  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable = Share of Hours in Automatable Jobs   
 Pooled ≥ 40 Years Old 26-39 Years Old < 25 Years Old Male Female White Black 
Min Wage    -0.0033 -0.0073  -0.0024  -0.0082  -0.0011  -0.0048  -0.0033  -0.0400   
 (0.0024) (0.0041)  (0.0033)  (0.0046)  (0.0017)  (0.0035)  (0.0024)  (0.0051)  
N 30963  30963  30963 30963      30963 30963 30963 22800 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Min Wage  0.0009 -0.0103 -0.0073 0.0065 -0.0040 0.0039 -0.0097 -0.0122 
 (0.0027) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0065) (0.0044) (0.0109) (0.0057) (0.0139) 
N 3017 3017 3011 3000 3017 2990 3016 3006 
Dependent Variable = Hours Difference from Period 1 to Period 2     
 Pooled ≥ 40 Years Old 26-39 Years Old < 25 Years Old Male Female White Black 
Min Wage x Routine    -0.2282 -0.2490 -0.2588 -0.0832  -0.1747 -0.0978  -0.2590 0.0959 
 (0.0240) (0.0351) (0.0425) (0.0541) (0.0389) (0.0307) (0.0265) (0.0731) 
Routine  0.8008 0.8048 1.0004 0.0335 0.8884 -0.0932  0.8974 0.4930 
 (0.1436) (0.2139) (0.2511) (0.3155) (0.2360) (0.1819) (0.1572) (0.4380) 
N 696432 330014 225466 140952 384574 311858 568524 82581 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Min Wage x Routine    -0.1851 -0.1972 -0.2779 -0.2638 -0.0840 -0.0591  -0.0761 -0.1379 
 (0.1568) (0.0372) (0.0955) (0.1371) (0.0491)  (0.1280) (0.0393) (0.1091) 
Routine  -0.5174 0.7316 -0.2775 1.1842 0.5282 -0.3942       -0.2190 -0.0942 
 (0.9559) (0.2127) (0.5628) (0.7451) (0.2980) (0.6856) (0.2550) (0.5918) 
N 696432 77628 122638 46009     23443 138791 29655 208287 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. In the bottom panel, the sample only includes individuals who remained employed between the two periods, so the sample sizes are lower than 
for the employment regressions.  
  
 
  
Table 7: Contemporary Analysis, 1995-2016   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable = Share of Employment in Automatable Jobs   
 
Pooled 
≥ 40  
Years Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Min Wage  -0.0057  -0.0088 -0.0039  -0.0078 -0.0013  -0.0079  -0.0062  -0.0029  
    (0.0031)  (0.0041)  (0.0033)  (0.0053)  (0.0021)  (0.0047)  (0.0033)  (0.0077)  
N 19154  11886 11860 11510 12020 11553 12025 8264 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Min Wage  0.0002 -0.0085 -0.0118 0.0047 -0.0039 -0.0066 -0.0095 -0.0208 
 (0.0025) (0.0089) (0.0069) (0.0082) (0.0044) (0.0095) (0.0045) (0.0108) 
N 1964 1964 1959 1954 1964 1945 1963 1957 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period    
 
Pooled 
≥ 40 Years 
Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Min Wage  -0.0040 -0.0074 -0.0046 -0.0077 -0.0001 -0.0041 -0.0072 0.0008 
   x Routine (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0036) 
Routine  0.0312 0.0365 0.0265 0.0395 0.0030 0.0160 0.0388 -0.0133 
 (0.0058) (0.0087) (0.0065) (0.0186) (0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0169) 
N 322827 119340 140110 63377 144667 178160 272342 34614 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Min Wage  -0.0121 -0.0068 -0.0057 0.0025 0.0059 -0.0039 -0.0016 0.0054 
   x Routine (0.0084) (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.0037) 
Routine  0.1282 0.0314 0.0368 -0.0237 -0.0480 0.0350 0.0151 -0.0310 
 (0.0441) (0.0133) (0.0220) (0.0325) (0.0153) (0.0198) (0.0087) (0.0180) 
N 34395 65414 21674 12412 58907 16496 91089 12387 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Having the Same Job in the Current Period    
 
Pooled 
≥ 40 Years 
Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Min Wage  -0.0090 -0.0102 -0.0069 -0.0164 -0.0067 -0.0073 -0.0094 -0.0073 
   x Routine (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0057) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0053) 
Routine  0.0334 0.0409 0.0232 0.0828 0.0381 0.0036 0.0365 0.0178 
 (0.0075) (0.0144) (0.0101) (0.0286) (0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0095) (0.0253) 
N 325936 120069  140684 65183 146763 179173 274888 35054 
 Construct Manu. Transport Wholesale Retail Finance Services P. Adm. 
Min Wage  -0.0258 -0.0050 -0.0179 0.0035 -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0201 -0.0065 
   x Routine (0.0119) (0.0037) (0.0075) (0.0061) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0035) (0.0069) 
Routine  0.1192 0.0125 0.0467 -0.0420 -0.0078 -0.0256 0.0936 0.0294 
 (0.0598) (0.0175) (0.0389) (0.0312) (0.0197) (0.0309) (0.0177) (0.0342) 
N 34559 65833 21776 12482 60061 16503 92229 12458 
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 4.  
 
  
Table 8: Examples of Top and Bottom Tertile Wage Occupations in Manufacturing 
 Top Tertile Bottom Tertile 
1 Repairers of data processing equipment  Sawing machine operators  
2 Water and sewage treatment plant operators  Assemblers of electrical equipment  
3 Millwrights  Food roasting and baking machine operators  
4 Supervisors of mechanics and repairers  Cooks  
5 Elevator installers and repairers  Packers  
6 Repairers of electrical equipment  Parking lot attendants 
7 Plant and system operators, stationary engineers  Metal platers  
8 Railroad conductors and yardmasters  Textile sewing machine operators  
9 Electricians  Clothing pressing machine operators 
10 Tool and die-makers and die-setters  Molders and casting machine operators  
 
   
 
  
Table 9: Manufacturing Low-Wage versus High-Wage Occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Pooled 
≥ 40 Years 
Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Dependent Variable =  Share of Employment in Automatable Jobs 
Low-Wage 
Min Wage  -0.0203  -0.0358  -0.0199  -0.0108  -0.0164 -0.0212  -0.0301   -0.0400 
 (0.0078)  (0.0144)  (0.0090)  (0.0126)  (0.0074)  (0.0118)  (0.0069)  (0.0168)  
N 4403  4403  4403  3968  4403 4401  4403  3386  
High-Wage 
Min Wage  0.0027  0.0013  0.0015  -0.0042  0.0090  -0.0084  0.0151  0.0131  
 (0.0062)  (0.0092)  (0.0080)  (0.0181)  (0.0174)  (0.0083)  (0.0074)  (0.0167)  
N 4551  4551  4551  2055  4551  4548   4551  1627  
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period  
Low-Wage 
Min Wage  -0.0016 -0.0038 -0.0055 -0.0107 0.0007 -0.0055 -0.0010 0.0035 
   x Routine (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0035) 
Routine  0.0167 0.0233 0.0372 0.0495 0.0045 0.0372 0.0161 -0.0118 
 (0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0073) (0.0113) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0043) (0.0134) 
N 135685 40904  67773 27008  67912 67773 115050 16687 
High-Wage 
Min Wage  0.0002 -0.0037 0.0006 -0.0088 0.0003 0.0093 0.0005 0.0013 
   x Routine (0.0038) (0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0265) (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0066) 
Routine  -0.0023 0.0040 -0.0041 0.0063 -0.0009 -0.0361 -0.0032 0.0142 
 (0.0124) (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0679) (0.0135) (0.0221) (0.0123) (0.0325) 
N 24078 14501  7963  1614  19500 4578 22986 758 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period 
Low-Wage  
Min Wage  -0.0020 -0.0079 -0.0066 -0.0125 -0.0032 0.0018 0.0004 -0.0686 
   x Routine (0.0036) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0316) (0.0053) (0.0103) (0.0035) (0.1288) 
Routine  -0.0036 0.0146 0.0129 0.0279 0.0014 -0.0260 -0.0108 0.2456 
 (0.0039) (0.0049)  (0.0076)  (0.0101)  (0.0072)  (0.0087)  (0.0050)  (0.0129)  
N 135685 61436 47241  27008  67912 67773 115050 16687 
High-Wage  
Min Wage  0.0017 0.0014 -0.0000 -0.0030 0.0006 0.0051 0.0011 0.0113 
   x Routine (0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0052) 
Routine  -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0058 0.0170 -0.0012 -0.0108 0.0028 -0.0406 
 (0.0136)  (0.0198)  (0.0222)  (0.0405) (0.0212)  (0.0246)  (0.0148)  (0.0364)  
N 24078 14501  7963  1614  19500 4578 22986 758 
Notes: see notes to Tables 2, 3, and 4.  
   
 
 
 
Appendix A: Manufacturing Low-Wage Industries versus High-Wage Industries   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Pooled 
≥ 40 Years 
Old 
26-39 
Years Old 
< 25 
Years Old Male Female White Black 
Dependent Variable =  Share of Employment in Automatable Jobs 
Low-Wage 
Min Wage  -0.0199  -0.0201 -0.0061 -0.0207 -0.0166  -0.0219 -0.0142  -0.0281  
    (0.0081)  (0.0085)  (0.0074)  (0.0168) (0.0870)  (0.0100)  (0.0076) (0.0168)  
N 4515   4515   4515  4254  4515  4515  4406  2917  
High-Wage 
Min Wage  0.0035  -0.0031  0.0094   0.0240  0.0014  -0.0860  0.0027  -0.0063  
    (0.0067)  (0.0099)  (0.0109)  (0.0134)  (0.0080)  (0.0101)  (0.0082)  (0.0208)  
N 4515  4515  4515  3780 4515  4515  4505  2917  
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Current Period  
Low-Wage 
Min Wage  -0.0032 -0.0049 -0.0014 -0.0095 -0.0006 -0.0076 -0.0027 -0.0010 
   x Routine (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0044) 
Routine  0.0127 0.0179 0.0014 0.0457 0.0051 0.0285 0.0106 0.0078 
 (0.0061) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0119) (0.0059) (0.0105) (0.0065) (0.0154) 
N 88809 41360  30675  16774  47635 41174 75950 10091 
High-Wage 
Min Wage  0.0014 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0040 0.0018 -0.0099 0.0021 0.0034 
   x Routine (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0015) (0.0065) 
Routine  -0.0096 -0.0045 -0.0093 0.0130 -0.0116 0.0454 -0.0104 -0.0330 
 (0.0052) (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0212) (0.0044) (0.0130) (0.0051) (0.0228) 
N 65650 33496 23327  8827  50638 15012 57490 7163 
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Employed in the Same Job Current Period 
Low-Wage  
Min Wage  -0.0021 -0.0051 -0.0042 -0.0116 -0.0007 -0.0068 -0.0032 0.0092 
   x Routine (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0017) (0.0072) 
Routine  0.0073 0.0219 0.0179 0.0480 -0.0035 0.0429 0.0111 -0.0381 
 (0.0069) (0.0099) (0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0084) (0.0155) (0.0070) (0.0219) 
N 88809 41360  30675  16774  47635 41174 75950 10091 
High-Wage  
Min Wage    0.0024 0.0030 0.0020 0.0017 -0.0028 0.0086 0.0029 0.0059 
   x Routine (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0062) 
Routine  -0.0170 -0.0194 -0.0155 -0.0160 0.0006 -0.0386 -0.0182 -0.0290 
 (0.0050) (0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0072) (0.0091) (0.0052) (0.0225) 
N 65650 33496 23327  8827  50638 15012 57490 7163 
Notes: See notes to Tables 2, 3, and 4. For each low-skill sub-industry (at the two-digit level) within manufacturing, 
we compute average wages from the 1980-2016 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS. The low-wage sub-
sample is the bottom tertile of industries in this distribution, and the high-wage subsample is the top tertile.  
